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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
By Brian Michael Jenkins
Contemporary terrorists have made public transportation a new theater of
operations. Algerian extremists set off bombs on the subways of Paris in 1995
and 1996; the Irish Republican Army has waged a long-running terrorist
campaign against both passenger trains in England and London’s subways;
Palestinian terrorists have carried out suicide bombings on Israel's buses; an
individual or a group calling itself “Sons of the Gestapo” derailed a passenger
train in Arizona in 1995. Islamic extremists planned to set off truck bombs in
New York’s tunnels and bridges in 1993, and in 1997, they plotted suicide
bombings in New York’s subways. The nerve gas attack on Tokyo’s subways
by members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect in 1995 raised the specter that terrorists
in the future might resort to weapons of mass destruction to which public
transportation is uniquely vulnerable.
Recent events make it clear that the threat continues: 1998 saw an attempt to
derail Japan's bullet train and a threatened poison gas attack on Moscow's
subway. In 1999, a bomb injured three persons at a Sydney rail station. In
2000, bomb threats shut down London’s Underground; one bomb injured nine
in Dusseldorf’s Underground; another bomb killed nine and injured 60 on the
Metro in Manila.
For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately,
public transportation is an ideal target. Precisely because it is public and used
by millions of people daily, there is little security, with no obvious checkpoints
like those at airports to inspect passengers and parcels.
Passengers are strangers, promising attackers anonymity and easy escape.
Concentrations of people in contained environments are especially vulnerable
to conventional explosives and unconventional weapons. Attacks on public
transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments, cause great
disruption and alarm, which are the traditional goals of terrorism.
The United States has not experienced ongoing terrorist campaigns like those
waged by the IRA in the United Kingdom or by various Palestinian extremist
groups in Israel. Incidents here have been isolated and statistically rare
although sometimes of great consequence, in particular, the terrorist bombings
at the World Trade Center in 1993 and at the Oklahoma City federal building.
A number of terrorist bombings have been thwarted by vigilant authorities.
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These incidents, however, confirm that the terrorist threat in the United States
is real, although there is no consensus on the nature and magnitude of that
threat.
Because terrorist threats are not easily quantifiable, it is difficult to determine
the “right” level of security. Using cost-benefit analysis as the sole criterion to
determine the level of security is inadequate. The risk of death to any
individual citizen from terrorism in any venue is minuscule, making it difficult
to argue for any security measure solely on the grounds that it will save lives.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the costs of security are not
determined solely by the number or capabilities of the potential attackers; they
also are determined by the size and number of targets to be defended.
Surface transportation cannot be protected in the way we protect commercial
aviation. Trains and buses must remain readily accessible, convenient, and
inexpensive. Passenger profiling, the elaborate deployment of metal detectors,
X-ray machines, explosives sniffers, hand searches, and armed guards, which
have become features of the landscape at airports, cannot be transferred easily
to subway stations or bus stops. The delays would be enormous, the costs
prohibitive. Rail lines, like power lines or pipelines, are extremely difficult to
protect.
This does not mean, however, that nothing can be done. Transportation
operators and security officials in areas that have been subjected to terrorist
attacks have developed some effective security countermeasures. Although
they cannot entirely prevent terrorist attacks—no security system can stop
terrorists from setting off bombs in public places—good security measures can
make terrorist operations more difficult, increase the terrorists’ likelihood of
being detected and identified, keep casualties and disruptions to a minimum,
reduce panic, and reassure alarmed passengers in a crisis.
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
In order to meet the threat posed by terrorism and other forms of violent crime
effectively, it is essential that transportation system operators have a thorough
understanding of the security measures employed by other operators,
especially by those transportation entities that confront high levels of threat.
Since 1996, the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) has supported a
continuing research program aimed at identifying the “best practices” for
protecting public surface transportation—facilities, equipment, and
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passengers—against terrorist attacks and other major violent crimes. This
research has been supported by the United States Department of
Transportation, Caltrans, and the Mineta Transportation Institute’s own funds.
The effort began with a symposium held in 1996 that brought together security
experts from transportation entities, law enforcement, and other government
agencies. The results of their discussions were published by MTI in Terrorism
in Transportation–A Symposium (San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta International
Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, March 1996). For
convenience, this report will be referred to in the text as Volume I.
The following year, MTI launched a more formal research program aimed at
identifying the best security practices. The first phase of this effort included
four case studies that reviewed transportation security measures in Paris,
Atlanta, New York, and on the Amtrak rail system. The Paris case study
focused on the immediate aftermath of the 1995 terrorist bombing at the St.
Michel Station. Further terrorist bombings occurred in France in the fall of
1995 and again in December 1996, obliging authorities to increase security.
The Atlanta case study focused on the security preparations connected with the
1996 Olympics and the aftermath of the Centennial Park bombing, although
this bombing was not directed against public transportation. The Amtrak case
study focused on the response to the deliberate derailing of the Sunset Limited
in Arizona in November 1995. New York was included because of the size and
complexity of its transportation systems and the various incidents and threats
that have affected it, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
subsequent plot to blow up bridges and tunnels, and the 1996 explosion at the
Battery Park subway station. As these case studies were being completed,
police in 1997 discovered a terrorist plot to carry out suicide bombings on the
New York City subways.
All the case studies were conducted with the full cooperation of the operating
entity and are based on reviews of plans and after-action reports, interviews
with company officials and public authorities, and media accounts of the
events.
During this phase of the research, an additional task was performed. The
Federal Transportation Agency (FTA) previously had examined security
practices at nine public transportation systems in the United States. The
systems included multimodal transportation systems, medium-sized and large
bus systems, and small and rural bus systems. The FTA reviews were based not
on case studies but on surveys, and they did not focus exclusively on terrorism
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but included a broader spectrum of crimes against property (that is, objects
thrown at vehicles, arson, and hate crimes), crimes against persons (assaults on
passengers, attacks on operators or drivers, weapons offenses, and homicides),
and dramatic impact crimes such as bomb threats and terrorism. This material
was reformatted and included so that it could be compared more easily with the
four case studies.
In addition to preparing the case studies, the author compiled a chronology of
terrorist attacks and major criminal assaults on surface transportation and
added an annotated bibliography of publications dealing with surface
transportation security. The results were published by MTI in Protecting
Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case
Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks by Brian
Michael Jenkins and Dr. Larry Gerston (San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta
International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, December
1997). In the text, this report will be referred to as Volume II.
Further research added four more case studies, updated the chronology through
2000, and expanded the annotated bibliography. The new case studies included
the United Kingdom’s response to the IRA’s long-running terrorist campaign
against mainland surface transportation; the 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo’s
subways, the first large-scale terrorist use of a chemical weapon, which
provoked growing concern elsewhere; and security at the Bay Area Rapid
Transit District (BART) and the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (VTA).
Results of this research were reported in Protecting Public Surface
Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on
Best Security Practices by Brian Michael Jenkins and Dr. Larry Gerston (San
Jose: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2001). This will be referred to in the text
as Volume III.
Taken together, the three volumes present a comprehensive review of surface
transportation security covering fourteen transportation systems in the United
States and three systems abroad. They offer an opportunity to examine how
operators of different systems—subways, commuter rail, and intercity and city
buses—have dealt with different kinds of threats, from ordinary crime to
isolated sabotage to long-term bombing campaigns to chemical attacks.
The effort will now focus on distilling the lessons learned from these
experiences and cataloging the best security practices. This executive summary
identifies these lessons and practices. Future workshops and symposia will
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offer opportunities for system operators and authorities charged with security
responsibilities to discuss them in greater depth.
PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN TERRORIST ATTACKS
Only by understanding the threat can we develop effective security measures.
Although the United States has been largely spared the kinds of terrorist
campaigns waged against public surface transportation in the United Kingdom,
France, Japan, and less-developed countries, the unfortunately rich history of
violence elsewhere can be used to better understand terrorist tactics, targets,
and techniques.
Volumes II and III contain a chronology of approximately 900 terrorist attacks
and other significant criminal incidents involving public surface transportation
systems. The chronology runs from 1920 to 2000; however, all but 14 of the
events listed occurred after 1970, the year that marks the beginning of modern
terrorism.
Despite efforts to include all significant incidents, the chronology should be
considered representative rather than comprehensive. Thousands of incidents
of ordinary crime, such as individual murders, rapes, armed robberies, and
other assaults, are not included. Nor does the chronology report all the many
bomb threats that are a common headache for transportation system operators.
The chronology includes guerrilla and terrorist attacks in which a
transportation system or its passengers were the principal target. It excludes
acts of open warfare, such as aerial bombing and artillery fire.
The chronology shows that contemporary terrorists view public surface
transportation as a killing field. While roughly 20 percent of all incidents of
international terrorism involve fatalities, the proportion of attacks on surface
transportation systems involving fatalities is significantly higher. About twothirds of the attacks on surface transportation have been intended to kill, and
about 37 percent of the total involve fatalities.
A further indication of lethality is the percentage of incidents with multiple
fatalities: 74 percent of the attacks with fatalities involve more than one
fatality, and 23 percent involve 10 or more. Attacks are roughly evenly split
between rail systems (trains, subways, stations, and rails) and bus systems
(buses of all types and bus depots—see Appendix B, Figure 1).
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Our count of bomb threats, although far from complete, indicates that
bombings predominate as the most frequent mode of terrorist attack (see
Appendix B, Figure 2). Overall, bombings account for 60 percent of all
incidents; ambushes and armed assaults account for 11 percent; standoff
attacks, 9 percent; hostage situations, 5 percent; and mechanical sabotage,
5 percent.
By definition, the chronology includes only attacks on public surface
transportation, thereby excluding terrorist attacks involving other targets.
However, in many instances, the chronology refers to ongoing conflicts,
including civil wars, guerrilla wars, and terrorist campaigns. Often these
combatants bring their violence to the capital cities to obtain international
attention and to remind complacent populations that they will have no peace
while wars rage in distant lands.
Of course, attacks on public transportation are only one facet of these conflicts.
Under the circumstances, they are to be expected. The threat level is high. The
violence is ferocious. Governments and transportation operators are obliged to
take extraordinary measures that would be difficult to justify outside of the
conflict zones.
Leaving out countries with ongoing armed conflicts would eliminate about
two-thirds of the incidents and would provide a different picture of the threat.
Bomb threats, acts of sabotage, extortion, individual assaults, and isolated
crimes would predominate. There would be fewer fatalities. Individuals with
personal motives and mentally deranged perpetrators would figure more
prominently. The threat in these circumstances becomes less predictable,
which, in turn, creates dilemmas for security planners.
Absent an ongoing armed conflict and without reliably precise and timely
warnings from intelligence efforts, how do transportation providers and
security planners protect against terrorism? How much security is enough? Is
the answer to these questions the same everywhere? Should San Francisco’s
BART or a medium-sized bus company in rural America adopt the same
measures as those used by London Transport?
Location does make a difference. This does not mean that a terrorist event
cannot occur in a small or medium-sized city seemingly distant from national
symbols, the political centers of power, and the more complicated social
geography of our major cities—witness the Oklahoma City bombing—but it
does mean that attacks in such areas are less likely. Historically, the United
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States, although a comparatively violent country, has not suffered high levels
of terrorist violence. Within the United States, six major metropolitan areas
(New York, Miami, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles) account for a majority of the terrorist incidents, although owing to the
magnitude of the event in Oklahoma City, not a majority of casualties.
SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM
Threat assessment cannot be based solely upon perceived vulnerabilities,
which are infinite, or hypothetical foes. At the same time, the absence of a
specific threat cannot be an excuse for doing nothing at all. Security planners,
therefore, should not consider the list of best practices in Appendix A as
formulaic. It is a catalog from which planners can choose the best options for
the location and nature of their specific transportation systems.
Cost is a legitimate criterion in designing security measures, and security
budgets are limited. However, many of the security measures identified as best
practices in the case studies have been found to contribute also to the
efficiency of transport operations (vehicle locating systems, multimode
communications), to passenger safety (design and materials used in station and
coach construction), to making systems more convenient and attractive to
passengers (good lighting, clean and well-kept interiors, up-to-the-minute
information on system status, visible presence of staff), and to reducing
ordinary crime (closed-circuit television [CCTV], high-profile and undercover
patrolling). Those anti-terrorist security measures that have an obvious
deterrent effect on criminal activity should be favored.
Many measures involve only modest expenditure. Improving liaison with local
police and other emergency responders, establishing crisis management plans,
conducting exercises, and putting in place procedures for handling bomb
threats and left or suspicious objects are not costly undertakings. Technology
that further reduces security operating costs also should be favored.
As mentioned previously, physical security by itself does not prevent terrorism,
but good security can displace the risk, pushing terrorists toward still
vulnerable but less lucrative targets where their actions are likely to cause
fewer casualties. Terrorists will always find a vulnerable place to attack. They
can attack anything, anywhere, anytime. We cannot protect everything,
everywhere, all the time, which means that security often will necessarily be
reactive. Security is increased after an attack to plug any gaps that the attack
has made obvious, in anticipation of further possible similar attacks, and to
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reassure an apprehensive public that something is being done. The added
security measures may be suspended when the threat is reduced, although these
measures are more easily increased than reduced—once in place, security
measures have a tendency to become a permanent feature of the landscape.
This, in turn, suggests that security measures should be flexible, capable of
being increased or reduced in accordance with the perceived threat.
The following basic principles dictate the overall strategic approach to security
for public surface transportation:
•

Security has two major objectives: Preventing casualties is the paramount
goal; reducing disruption in the form of unnecessary shutdowns is the
secondary goal.

•

Security cannot prevent terrorist attacks, but it can persuade terrorists
(except those for whom escape or even their own survival does not matter)
to choose less lucrative targets.

•

Potential casualties can be reduced both through the design of stations and
vehicles and through effective and rapid response.

•

Disruptions can be minimized with technologies and procedures that
permit prompt assessment, accurate diagnosis, and rapid, well-rehearsed
responses.

Effective security, therefore, includes not only deterrent and preventive
measures but all efforts to mitigate casualties, damage, and disruption. Since
deterrence and prevention are difficult to achieve given the nature of terrorism
and the inherent vulnerabilities of public transportation, great emphasis is
placed upon the mitigation of casualties through design of facilities and upon
effective, rapid response that ensures safety while minimizing disruption.
Crisis management planning is essential. Constant training, including tabletop
simulations and field exercises involving operating entities and local
authorities, is essential to rapid response and successful crisis management.
The security topics listed here fall into two broad categories: (1) pre-incident
preparedness, including threat assessment, security in station and vehicle
design, security personnel, security technology, and communications; and (2)
response and recovery, including crisis management planning, procedures for
dealing with bomb threats and suspicious objects, emergency response teams,
frequent exercises, dealing with victims and their families, and reassuring
apprehensive passengers.
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Pre-Incident Preparedness: A Comprehensive Security Plan
Most transport operators have plans for dealing with service interruptions
caused by natural disasters, bad weather, accidents, or other incidents,
including serious crimes or acts of terrorism. These plans usually emphasize
minimizing disruption and maintaining service. Security issues often are
scattered among these plans or are addressed in separate documents that deal
with specific issues such as bomb threat response procedures. Operators may
or may not have a separate formal crisis management plan.
All transport operators should have an overall security plan or manual that
addresses organization and responsibilities, facilities and procedures,
preparation and response. This plan should be prepared in cooperation with
local authorities (that is, police and emergency responders), consistent with
best practices, approved by management, used as the basis for testing and
exercises, and regularly reviewed and updated.
Threat Assessment and Analysis
Almost all the information that transport operators receive about terrorism
comes from government authorities. In the United States, the federal
government will continue to be the principal source of information about
terrorist threats, although larger local police departments with intelligence
units may have additional information about threats in their locales. Many
large U.S. cities have antiterrorist task forces that facilitate the flow of
information and coordination between the FBI and local law enforcement
agencies. Unlike the commercial aviation industry, where there is an
established national structure for communicating terrorist threat information
directly, surface transportation operators may be at the end of a long line to
receive such information. The United Kingdom's system of communicating
terrorist threat levels to the commercial sector is enviable. To ensure their
awareness of current terrorist threats, transportation operators should
establish and maintain good formal and informal relations with both local
police and federal officials.
At the same time, transportation operators should not ignore their own sources
of knowledge. Specialized chronologies like those in Volumes II and III and
accounts of highly publicized attacks elsewhere in the world, which may
inspire local copycats, should be examined. In addition to having external
sources, operators are aware of local crime patterns that affect their systems
and should have detailed knowledge of how ordinary criminals, thieves, and
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vandals approach their facilities. British authorities discovered that IRA
terrorists followed the same paths used by vandals and graffiti taggers to
surreptitiously trespass on transportation property. Threat reviews should be
conducted at regular intervals.
Uncertainty, however, is the reality of dealing with terrorism, and serious
crimes like the mass shooting on the Long Island Railway by a mentally
disturbed gunman or extortion against the transit system remain entirely
unpredictable.
Every event that occurs must be closely analyzed to identify vulnerabilities and
establish the adversaries’ mode of attack. Identified gaps must be plugged, and
responses must be improved. A single event may be the beginning of a
campaign.
Station and Vehicle Design
When new stations are built or old ones remodeled, security should be a factor
in the design. In the United Kingdom, architectural liaison officers—specially
qualified police personnel with knowledge of blast effects on structure,
cladding, glazing, fixtures, and street furniture, and an understanding of the
principles of emergency evacuation routes and bomb security areas—advise
local companies on security issues in design and construction. In France, the
removal from rail stations of metal-framed wall signs and other extraneous
items, along with combustible materials, reduced potential casualties from
shrapnel, fire, and smoke inhalation.
Good station design includes emphasis on open space, including broad fields
of vision, the absence of dark corners and other spaces where criminals might
hide or terrorists could place bombs, good lighting, the effective deployment of
CCTV, installation of fire doors and blinds, ventilation shafts with reversible
fans to provide rapid smoke evacuation, emergency evacuation routes, and
bomb security areas.
Fencing and Other Physical Barriers. Public surface transportation must
have easy access, which limits the use of physical barriers. However, fences
should be built around bus yards, around public parking areas adjacent to
stations, and along surface tracks. Public parking areas also can be controlled
by gates, CCTV cameras aimed at the drivers of vehicles, and cameras
covering the entire parking area. Employee and visitor parking in bus yards
should be controlled by permit. Power facilities and buildings or rooms
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containing ventilation systems, electrical power connections and controls,
communications systems, switching controls, computers, and other vital
systems must remain locked, with access to them controlled and visually
monitored.
Access Control and Alarm Systems. Access control and intrusion detection
are areas of continuing rapid technological advance. Used in conjunction with
physical barriers and CCTV, access control systems enable security personnel
to monitor and protect vital systems (power facilities, control centers,
computers, communications, air conditioning systems, etc.). We have not
attempted to summarize this area in detail, as it is a major security topic with
its own extensive literature.
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV). Faced with serious terrorist threats, both
French and British systems have made extensive use of CCTV to protect
public transport. As of 1996, the Paris Metro and RER (commuter rail system)
had installed 4,000 cameras to monitor entrances and stations, to enable drivers
to check passengers, and to perform other security tasks, and more cameras
were being installed. The French video system employs sophisticated hardware
that combines the televised image with other types of data input and enables
operators to instantly summon the image from any camera (see Volume II).
By the late 1990s, British authorities had installed 3,500 cameras to keep
watch on the London Underground and rail transport; this number was being
increased to 5,000. All station cameras can be called up on demand and are
directly accessible by the police (see Volume III).
CCTV can be used to monitor activity, detect suspicious action, recognize
individuals, and identify suspects beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of these
tasks requires a progressively tighter focus and better image. Technology has
advanced rapidly in this area, producing cameras with increasingly better
resolution.
The mere presence of cameras probably contributes to deterrence, although
CCTV surveillance in Tokyo’s subway stations did not stop Japanese cult
members, one of whom was caught on a station camera, from disseminating
nerve gas. “Dummy” cameras are not recommended.
In locating cameras, transport operators should identify areas where passengers
are most vulnerable and not immediately visible to staff; they should situate
cameras so that they cannot easily be avoided, damaged, or obscured, and can
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be moved or added to later; and they should consider eventually extending
coverage to the surrounding areas. All passenger call boxes and help points
should be covered by cameras.
Police should record the locations of the cameras in advance so that images
from those cameras can be used to identify suspects and aid prosecutions.
Although CCTV has proved enormously effective in reducing crime and
contributing to the deterrence of terrorism, authorities have found that a
combination of CCTV coverage plus security patrols and prompt police
response makes the greatest contribution to security.
The emplacement of cameras on vehicles is a recent development brought
about by technological improvements. However, its effectiveness is limited by
the availability of bandwidth for broadcasting images from a large number of
vehicles. One solution would be to equip all vehicles with cameras (both
visible and hidden) that are brought on air by a distress signal from the driver
or an external command from the operations center. Another option would be
to equip buses or train coaches on high-crime routes with hidden surveillance
cameras temporarily.
Bomb Shelter Areas. In cases where time or specific circumstances do not
permit evacuation out and away from the facility, people can be routed to a
bomb shelter area. Bomb shelter areas are predetermined areas within a
building or other facility that have been examined by a structural engineer and
determined to provide protection against blast effects. These locations
typically are surrounded by full-height masonry or concrete walls (but are not
located in stairways or areas with access to elevator shafts that open to the
ground level); are away from windows, external doors, and walls (flying glass
is a major source of casualties in bomb blasts); and are away from the
“perimeter structural bay.” Bomb shelter areas also need access to
communications to keep occupants updated.
Limiting Availability of Trash Containers as Receptacles for Explosive
Devices. Because bombs are often left in trash containers, a great deal of
attention has been devoted to this issue. Removing trash cans entirely or
sealing permanent receptacles, sometimes an emergency response following a
bombing, are not useful long-term solutions as they could lead to piles of
rubbish, which, in turn, could provide suitable places for concealing explosive
devices and make bomb searches even more difficult.
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All trash containers should be monitored for use to identify and remove those
that are not absolutely necessary. Those remaining should be located in
prominent, well-lit areas within view of CCTV systems and away from sources
of secondary fragmentation such as windows, mirrors, or overhead glass. Trash
containers should not be located adjacent to obvious terrorist targets such as
police stations, post offices, or banks.
A number of blast-resistant trash containers now are commercially available.
Transparent trash-can liners provide a clear view of their contents.
Emergency Evacuation Routes. Emergency evacuation routes should be
preplanned to provide the safest means of egress in a variety of emergency
situations. For new facilities, this issue should be addressed in the design
phase. Evacuation routes should take people away from the point of danger
(for example, a suspicious object, a source of mysterious fumes) to a safe
location at a distance from the facility. The location of the safe area will
depend on the nature of the threat. For example, passengers evacuating from
subways in response to chemical or biological threats or attacks should not be
allowed to loiter on sidewalk ventilation grates above the stations and tunnels.
Evacuation routes should not clog the access routes of emergency responders
trying to get to the scene (these access routes should be designated in advance).
Alternate routes to bomb shelter areas, to be used when exit is not possible,
should be included in the evacuation plan.
Underground stations and subways in tunnels are the most difficult
environments to evacuate. The routes should be broad enough to accommodate
a surge of people (for example, no narrow staircases) and should contain no
obvious choke points (for example, elevators) where impatience and alarm
may lead to panic and casualties. Evacuation routes should be able to
accommodate stretchers and should be designated clearly by signage as well as
easily discerned identifiers, such as lighted colored arrows that can be switched
on in an emergency.
Design of Coaches and Buses. Safety reinforces security in new vehicles,
which are designed to withstand collisions and are constructed with materials
that will not easily burn or will not produce toxic fumes if they do burn.
Specific antiterrorist measures include the reduction of shrapnel-producing
interior fixtures, sealing areas below the seats to prevent easy concealment of
explosive or chemical dispersal devices, and the installation of both covert and
visible but protected CCTV cameras.
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The Security Force
Most large public transportation systems have their own dedicated security
force. This may be a proprietary private security force or a regular police
department dedicated to the transit authority, such as the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) Police Department or Port Authority Police in
New York. Some larger urban police departments may have a dedicated transit
police division. Operators of smaller transport entities are more dependent on
regular local police, who may or may not have specific responsibilities and
training for responding to incidents involving transportation systems.
Proprietary security forces and dedicated police forces generally deal with
routine patrolling and ordinary street crime. Major security challenges, such as
the Olympics or a continuing terrorist campaign, require cooperation and
augmentation from several police departments. While self-reliance is a
desirable goal, reality often dictates that additional external resources are
required. Jurisdictions also vary depending on the location and nature of the
crime. Complexity is guaranteed. Coordination is required, and it is not easy.
Rail systems, especially underground rail systems, are special environments
for which security personnel require special training. To work in these
unfamiliar environments, regular police must be given detailed training and
guidance or be accompanied by dedicated personnel (page 65 of Volume I).
The United Kingdom, although it fields a transport police force of 2,000, has
tried to improve overall awareness, training, and response capabilities at the
local level by designated Counter Terrorist Crime Prevention Officers
(CTCPOs) in each police department. CTCPOs receive special training and
provide guidance to their private sector “clients.” Absent a CTCPO equivalent,
the same approach can be taken through less formal but still structured liaison
arrangements created at the initiative of the transport operator.
There is no right number for the size of the security force. It will depend on the
size and nature of the system, the organizational structure in place, and the
level of threat.
Security requires the active participation of the transit entity’s security
personnel and civilian staff, special transit police in cities where they exist,
local police, and the general public. Intercity transport may involve a number
of local police jurisdictions. Procedures should be standardized as much as
possible. This requires the dissemination of detailed guidance to all involved
parties. In the United Kingdom, the National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit
(NTCPU) performs this task by analyzing terrorist and criminal threats and
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providing police and transport operators with lessons learned, best practices,
and detailed guidance on everything from trash bins to the proper emplacement
of CCTV to dealing with bomb threats. No such entity exists in the United
States, although a similar role could be assumed by the Department of
Transportation working through one of its research institutes.
High Profile and Plainclothes Patrols. Many public transportation systems
use a combination of highly visible and plainclothes patrols. Visible patrols
provide an obvious deterrent and reassure passengers, while plainclothes
patrols, their presence occasionally publicized through arrests, greatly increase
uncertainty on the part of would-be adversaries. Plainclothes patrols are
especially useful in high-crime areas or during outbreaks of crime; they will
not stop a determined suicide bomber, but they will give pause to the adversary
who wants to carry out his mission and escape.
The Role of Civilian Staff. All transport system staff members contribute to
security, whether or not that is their primary responsibility. Just their visible
presence adds to deterrence, and some transport operators have deliberately
deployed civilian staff to make them more visible, which also reassures
passengers. Employees are effective monitors of what is going on. They are
often the first to notice left or suspicious objects. They will be best positioned
to recognize and diagnose trouble. They are truly the first responders to any
incident, and they are the most reliable communicators in the first moments of
an incident. They are the shepherds who will lead passengers to safety and who
will guide emergency responders to the problem, and they are the people who
stand by to restore operations.
Because these roles are not explicit, civilian employees often are overlooked
when it comes to training and equipment that would assist them in performing
these vital tasks. Providing training does not mean altering the primary
responsibilities of civilian staff members, but recognizing that a security role
automatically comes with their presence on the scene. It also recognizes that
they are often among the first casualties. When station personnel in Tokyo
removed by hand the deadly sarin-leaking bags from the subway coaches, they
were unaware that they were exposing themselves to illness and death in the
process. Training in awareness, surveillance, response procedures, and selfprotection is owed the civilian staff.
Training. Training programs vary depending on the configuration of the
security force. Where security is provided by local police, officers undergo
regular police academy training. They may or may not receive additional
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special training to familiarize themselves with unique public transportation
issues. Ideally, they will. Where security is provided by a transit police division
or a separate transportation police department, regular police training is
supplemented by special training.
Proprietary private security forces and contract security personnel rarely
receive police training, and the quality of the security training they do receive
varies greatly. Although civilian staff are relied on as a “first line of defense”
and expected to apply psychological profiles and recognize and exercise
judgment regarding suspicious packages, they rarely receive adequate formal
training to do so. In addition to providing formal training, the British make
extensive use of laminated cards containing basic instructions for operators
and nonspecialist police officers who are confronted with bomb threats,
suspicious objects, and other contingencies.
Management-level personnel who will be involved in on-scene response and
crisis management should meet minimum training requirements through
attending disaster management courses, in-house training, and regular
exercises. Command team members should be fully educated on available
local, state, and federal disaster response services and should know how to
request them (pages 50-51 of Volume I).
Covert Testing. Faced with a continuing terrorist threat, British transport
security authorities emphasize covert testing of security and response
procedures to ensure that security personnel and civilian staff remain alert and
are familiar with procedures. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration also
conducts increasingly realistic covert testing to ensure high standards of
security at the nation’s airports. Covert testing followed by critiques should be
an integral part of the security plan.
Public Involvement in Security. There are pros and cons to encouraging
public involvement in security. The fact that passengers are constantly being
advised to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior increases the risks
perceived by would-be attackers who imagine themselves to be under constant
surveillance. Vigilant passengers often are the first to notify authorities of left
items or suspicious objects. Repeated public warnings, however, may also
frighten passengers, inspire hoaxes, and lead to numerous false alarms. Where
the terrorist threat is remote, the potential adverse consequences may outweigh
the benefits. However, where terrorist attacks have occurred and the threat
level remains high, the risk of hoax threats and false alarms is already high.
Israel, France, the United Kingdom, and other countries that have experienced
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terrorist campaigns have sought public participation through signs and
repeated public announcements reminding travelers to keep personal packages
under their direct control, remain vigilant for left parcels, and immediately
report suspicious activity or articles to staff. In the United Kingdom, police are
confident that any such parcels will be discovered within a few minutes, far
less time than terrorist bombers normally allow when they set their timers to
permit them to escape. The objective is to move the bombers toward lessfrequented areas where, if a bomb did explode, it would likely cause fewer
casualties. Public announcements also warn people not to touch suspicious
objects. Public vigilance plus rapid response can reduce the risk of casualties
and disruption. Involving passengers in their own security also has the
psychological effect of reducing anxiety by transforming passengers from
seeing themselves exclusively as helpless victims to seeing themselves as
contributing to their own security.
Security Technology
Computerized System Layout. New York Transit has developed a
computerized database capable of depicting the rail track network, with
corresponding street grid, emergency exits, access points, and ventilation fans
in selected sectors of the system. This enables the operations center to readily
envision all options in a crisis situation. An emergency mobile command
center equipped with a duplicate of the computerized layout can be dispatched
to the scene.
Security System Integration. The installation of access control systems—
alarmed doorways backed by thousands of cameras—increases the
requirement for personnel to monitor them and presents a challenge for
security systems integration. Advances are being made in automated problem
recognition; for example, a breach of a secure zone automatically brings a
camera to focus on the site of the breach and alerts a security official at the
operations center. Fortunately, technology is moving fast in this area, offering
cost-effective solutions.
Systems to Detect Chemical and Biological Agents. Government research on
systems to detect and identify dangerous chemicals or harmful pathogens in
the air is ongoing. While significant advances have been made and some
devices currently are being used by the military, by hazardous materials teams,
and by technical personnel in special circumstances, there is as yet no
commercially viable technology that would allow reliable continuous
monitoring of the air in large semi-enclosed areas such as train stations or
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subway systems. Moreover, where potential victims cannot promptly don
protective clothing and breathing apparatuses, the utility of warnings is
diminished. Fire department hazardous material teams are able to deploy
detectors when a chemical dispersal is suspected, however, and further
development is anticipated in this area.
Protecting Signal Systems. Vandalism is a common problem in rail
transportation. Authorities report more than 10,000 incidents a year
nationwide. In 1994, there were approximately 3,000 incidents of signal
vandalism, 154 of which resulted in derailments, although none involved
passenger trains. Ensuring the integrity of signal systems requires both
physical and electronic measures.
Track Monitoring. One of the most dangerous types of incidents is the
deliberate derailing of a speeding passenger train, although the one recent
derailing incident in the United States fortunately resulted in only one fatality.
In most urban rail systems, the frequency of trains itself acts as a security
measure. Where trains run with less frequency, opportunities for sabotage
increase. Track security is maintained by using the track itself as a low-voltage
electric circuit, with the rails as its conductor. When the current is interrupted
or compromised, the system displays a red signal to the engineer. In the 1995
Amtrak derailment, however, the saboteur spliced a shunt wire around the
dislocated rail section, thus bridging and preserving the circuit and allowing
the signal to display green. This, of course, takes knowledge and time.
Additional security for remote rail systems can be provided by regular patrols
and frequent track inspection.
GPS Tracking of Vehicles. Most modern rail systems provide real-time
information about the precise location of trains. GPS tracking technology has
improved and has become cheaper, enabling operators to identify the exact
location of specific buses or trains that may be experiencing a security
problem. GPS may be used in conjunction with duress switches for drivers and
on-board CCTV cameras that can be turned on remotely to provide authorities
with a picture of what is taking place on board.
Individual Location Devices. Personnel on foot in tunnels can be equipped
with locating devices that use the existing radio infrastructure. These devices
can be integrated with a vehicle-locating system to provide a graphic display of
the position of all security and response elements connected with the system.
Such technology is currently employed in Paris by the Metro and RATP (Régie
Autonome des Transports Parisiens) (see Volume II).
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Passenger Screening. The passenger screening procedures in place at
commercial airports are not feasible for public surface transportation. The
number of surface transportation passengers is too great, there are too many
points of access, and advance ticket purchase is not required. Attempting to
have all passengers pass through metal detectors before entering train or
subway stations or X-raying their parcels would create significant delays and
impose huge costs. Public surface transportation would cease to be convenient.
For buses, such measures would not work at all. However, this does not
preclude deploying some X-ray or other bomb detection technology to conduct
random security checks in extreme threat situations.
Communications
Multimodal communications are essential. Case studies show that
communication breakdowns resulting from technical failures or inadequate
procedures are a common problem. Explosions destroy hard lines. Radios do
not work well in tunnels. Backups are required. In an ideal situation, all drivers
and security staff have radios, although frequencies used by emergency
responders differ from those used by transport operators. A common-frequency
radio communications system should be set up in each local community,
permitting transportation staff and emergency response organizations to share
information and coordinate operators (page 53, Volume I). Inadequate
procedures compound technical problems, and information received by one
component (for example, bomb threats) may not be quickly relayed to response
agencies.
Communications with passengers should include several modes. Electronic
signs that routinely provide information about the time to arrival of the next
train can be used to provide instructions during emergencies, supplementing
public address systems. Larger urban systems must also recognize the need for
public announcements to be made in more than one language.
Passengers should be able to communicate with operators through clearly
indicated and readily accessible alarms, emergency telephones, and help points
on trains and in stations that will immediately connect the caller with a security
person or other staff member. Emergency call boxes should be under visible
CCTV surveillance (a camera focused at the caller) both to help security
officials assess the communicator and diagnose the situation and to discourage
hoax reports.
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Response and Recovery
Crisis Management Plans
Deterrence and prevention are difficult to achieve given the nature of terrorism
and the inherent vulnerability of public surface transportation; in most cases,
authorities will be responding to events that have occurred. The ability to
respond rapidly and effectively, mitigate casualties and damage, reduce
unnecessary disruption, deal with victims and their families and friends, and
reassure a nervous public is critical. Crisis management planning must be
regarded as an essential component of the overall security plan. Crisis
management plans must include procedures for notification and activation of
the crisis management team(s) and must indicate the roles and responsibilities
of all those involved. The plans must address evacuation and shutdown
procedures; dealing with victims, families, and relatives; liaison with local
emergency responders; ensuring safety and security of passengers after the
incident; restoring service or creating alternatives; issuing public information;
and reassuring anxious passengers.
Alert Levels with Predetermined Security Measures
To ensure the consistency of security responses in heightened threat conditions,
it is useful to identify in advance alert levels with predetermined security
measures. This enables authorities to warn operators of threat situations
without providing confidential details, and it allows operators to quickly adjust
security measures to the perceived level of threat.
U.S. airports currently operate under such a system, with the Federal Aviation
Administration informing airports and carriers of threat levels that then
mandate corresponding security measures. British authorities have developed a
similar system to assist rail operators and commercial centers to adjust their
security according to four levels of threat.
Security Augmentation. A major terrorist incident or publicized threat will
require that security be increased visibly to fill any obvious gaps, deter future
attacks, and reassure the public. Mutual aid agreements should be negotiated in
advance. After the first bomb attacks on its commuter rail and Metro systems,
France reinforced security on the RER, Metros, and other potential targets with
an additional 5,000 soldiers and gendarmes, a level beyond the capacity of
most departments but a demonstration of how huge the workforce burden can
become. Deployments of this magnitude in the United States would require
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mobilization of the National Guard at the state level or federal assistance,
actions that normally are seen only in large-scale civil disturbances but that are
increasingly being considered in response to catastrophic terrorist incidents.
Such augmentations would necessarily be of short duration. Their contribution
to actual security is debatable. Additional security personnel contribute to
deterrence, and nervous terrorists will move their attacks further out, away
from the heavy security. Nevertheless, additional security cannot prevent
determined attackers.
Responding to Bomb Threats. Bomb threats are by far the most common
method used by terrorists and others seeking to cause alarm and disruption.
Generally, terrorists do not begin a campaign with bomb threats, because they
have no established credibility. However, the disruptive effects of actual
terrorist bombings may be amplified subsequently with bomb threats, an IRA
technique. Bombings also inspire hoax threats. Therefore, transport operators
must have well-established protocols for dealing with bomb threats.
First, it is essential that the threat be relayed to the responsible persons,
whether it initially is telephoned to the police, transportation company
headquarters, switchboard operators, stationmasters, toll-free help lines,
reservation centers, or any other number. Everyone should be trained to obtain
as much information as possible from the caller and promptly forward it to the
appropriate authorities. A bomb threat checklist can be found in Appendix C of
Volume I. Some operators (for example, Amtrak) have instant recording
devices at all locations where bomb threats may come in. This allows all calls
to be captured and transmitted to the police. Second, a protocol for evaluating
the threat is needed. Actions can range from watchful waiting to local searches
to shutdowns and immediate evacuations. Evacuations will be rare. Authors of
bomb threats are rarely bombers. Even during the height of the IRA’s bombing
campaign, fewer than 2 percent of the threats were considered serious, and
evacuations or partial evacuations were ordered in response to fewer than
0.66 percent of the threats. Still, even when threats appear to be hoaxes, as
almost all are, they cannot be ignored. A reasonable assessment must be made
and appropriate action taken. The desire to avoid needless disruptions must be
balanced against the threat to public safety. Guidelines based upon actual
experience (and defensible in a court of law if things go wrong) are helpful in
taking the pressure off local decision makers.
Handling of Unattended Items. Public transportation systems deal with
thousands of items left unattended or left in stations and on trains and buses
each year. These impose a tremendous burden on security. Although
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unattended parcels are rarely linked to explosive devices, they all represent a
potential threat, and during periods of high alert, they need to be examined
systematically. To deal with the IRA’s terrorist campaign, British authorities
developed a standardized reporting form that records where the item was
found, its contents, whether the parcel was X-rayed, and whether the bomb
squad had been called. All left items are photographed.
The Tokyo and London case studies in Volume III underscore the importance
of diagnosis in dealing with terrorist attacks. In the Tokyo case, the mysterious
and unprecedented nature of the chemical attack prevented the prompt
shutdown of the affected trains and immediate evacuation; contaminated
coaches continued on their runs, causing more casualties. In the British case,
close analysis of the patterns of the terrorists allowed security authorities to
design more effective countermeasures.
Emergency Response Teams
Several of the public transportation operators examined in the case studies
have some form of mobile response team that can respond rapidly to serious
incidents that cause system disruption. These teams may comprise
management personnel who remain at operations headquarters or deploy to the
scene of a major incident and trained specialists who have specific
responsibilities, specialized training, and equipment for responding to
derailments, explosions, chemical incidents, etc. These operational personnel
can get to the scene of the incident within minutes. Some operators also have
teams with mobile tool sheds and rolling-stock-lifting teams, but their function
is related to restoration of service. Having a mobile command center with
proper communications equipment is a good idea. Despite the rapid reaction
capability of operators’ teams, they may be delayed by police and fire units
that arrive on the scene first and put in place strict security cordons. This
underscores the need for close coordination, recognizable badging, and joint
exercises.
Emergency Services
The capabilities of the local emergency services—fire, rescue, hazardous
materials, and medical services—are beyond the control of the transport
operator whose own resources are likely to be extremely limited. Transport
operators should be aware of the capabilities of the local services. Joint
exercises should be conducted regularly to identify and remove any
unnecessary obstacles to prompt, effective response. The World Trade Center
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and Oklahoma City bombings, along with heightened concerns about the
possibility of terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological substances,
have prompted the U.S. federal government to devote increasing resources to
improving the training and equipment of first responders.
Exercises
There are two ways to determine whether crisis response plans work. One is to
wait for a real-life incident and hope for success, since the learning curve is
very steep and mistakes can be fatal. The other is to conduct regular exercises,
both tabletop crisis response games and field exercises, aimed at specific
objectives, including testing response procedures, communication, and
coordination. Problem areas can be identified and remedies applied without
loss. The costs generally are modest, mainly consisting of time. A number of
large operations, including New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA), conduct such exercises regularly. Most plans, however, are never
tested until actual episodes occur.
Assistance for Victims and Their Families
A terrorist attack is, above all, a human tragedy. People are injured, perhaps
killed. The precise casualty count and the identities of the casualties and the
dazed survivors may remain unclear for hours, or even days, creating
agonizing uncertainty for relatives and friends. The problem is compounded in
the case of surface transportation by the absence of passenger manifests. While
rescue efforts focus on saving lives, investigators try to figure out what
happened and gather evidence to determine who was responsible. Operators
focus on clearing the wreckage and restoring operations.The task of dealing
with victims and their families, as well as those who fear that a relative or a
friend might be among those harmed, may be ignored or handled cavalierly.
This lack of assistance is one of the biggest sources of complaint and criticism
in air and surface transportation disasters.
Crisis management plans and exercises should address this issue directly. The
biggest challenges are seeing to the immediate nonmedical needs of the
survivors (assistance in communications, clothing, housing, counseling, etc.)
and providing accurate and timely information about casualty numbers and
identities. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has been given
these responsibilities, but transportation operators must be prepared to
participate actively. Crisis plans, therefore, should designate a manager who
will be responsible for these tasks.
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Working with the NTSB, transportation officials may establish an information
center near the location of a disaster (but not where it could hamper rescue and
investigative efforts) at which worried family members can seek assistance.
Information also can be disseminated through toll-free numbers established for
this purpose and through the news media.
The immediate needs of survivors should be promptly identified, and
reasonable assistance should be offered. In large-scale disasters, transport staff
may have to seek information aggressively from local hospitals regarding
emergency admissions; NTSB support will help there. Providing prompt
assistance to survivors and victim identification and location information to
relatives will not save lives, but it will spare the operating entity some of the
ugly criticisms that have come with inept handling of these tasks.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAD

computer-aided design

CCTV

closed-circuit television

CTCPO

Counter Terrorist Crime Prevention Officer

FTA

Federal Transportation Agency

GPS

Global Positioning System

HVAC

heating, ventilation, air conditioning

IRA

Irish Republican Army

MTA

Metropolitan Transportation Authority

MTI

Mineta Transportation Institute

NTCPU

National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

RATP

Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens

RER

Réseau Express Régional
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Best Practices Checklist

APPENDIX A: BEST PRACTICES CHECKLIST
PLANS
•

Comprehensive security plan

•

Alert levels with predetermined security measures

•

Emergency response plan

•

Coordinated with local authorities

•

Periodic review

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS
•

Periodic meetings with local, state, and federal authorities

•

Analysis of local crime patterns

STATION AND TERMINAL DESIGN
•

Target hardening

•

No highly combustible materials or sources of toxic fumes or shrapnel

•

Reversible fans

•

Open spaces

•

Good visibility

•

No hiding or hidden spaces

•

Adequate emergency exits

•

Designated evacuation routes

•

Bomb-secure areas with communications

•

Good lighting

•

Effective CCTV coverage

•

Easy to maintain and well-maintained

•

Bomb-resistant, well-placed trash containers
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VEHICLE DESIGN
•

Crumple impact zones

•

No highly combustible materials or sources of toxic fumes or shrapnel

•

Modification of car seats to eliminate concealment space

•

Visible or hidden CCTV coverage

PHYSICAL BARRIERS
•

Fencing for perimeters of parking lots and structures

•

Fencing for bus yards, maintenance depots, etc.

•

Fencing for vital facilities (power, fuel, etc.)

•

Fencing along track

•

Locked doors at signal boxes, electric controls, etc.

ACCESS CONTROL AND INTRUSION DETECTON
•

Headquarters and operations centers

•

Power stations and fuel depots

•

HVAC facilities

•

Bus yards and depots

•

Train yards and maintenance facilities

•

Other vital facilities

•

Integrated with CCTV

CCTV COVERAGE AND CAPABILITIES
•

Stations

•

Passenger call boxes and information points

•

Entrances

•

Parking lots and structures

•

Surrounding areas

•

Access-controlled doors
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•

On board vehicles

•

Pan, tilt, zoom where appropriate

•

Good quality image

•

Record full-time or on command

•

Date, time synchronized

•

Integrated with access control and intrusion detection

•

Can be transmitted directly to the police

A-3

TRACK AND SIGNAL MONITORING
•

Automatic systems (electric current, validation)

•

Patrols

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
•

Detectors in place

•

Protective gear for security staff

•

Breathing apparatuses available to station staff and drivers

COMMAND CENTERS
•

Designated crisis management center and alternate

•

Operations center

•

Mobile command center

CAD LAYOUTS AND GPS LOCATORS
•

CAD layout of system

•

GPS on buses

•

GPS on trains

•

GPS for individual security staff (displaying position at operations center)
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SECURITY ORGANIZATION
•

Proprietary security

•

Contracted security

•

Dedicated police department

•

Local police

•

Police departments along routes

•

Liaison with state and federal authorities

•

Involvement of civilian staff

•

Public involvement

AUGMENTED SECURITY
•

Arrangements in place with local police

•

K-9 units available

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
•

Multimodal communications

•

Dedicated landlines at track intervals

•

Dedicated landlines at stations

•

Direct lines to emergency services

•

All security personnel have two-way radios

•

All drivers have two-way radios

•

Common frequency for communications with emergency services

•

Cellular phone backup

•

Plan talk to eliminate misleading jargon

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
•

Emergency phones for passengers indicating caller location

•

Public address system

•

Multilingual public announcements
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Best Practices Checklist

TRAINING
•

Propriety security

•

Dedicated police department

•

Local police

•

Additional police jurisdictions along routes

•

Managers and members of crisis management teams

•

Civilian staff

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
•

Laminated cards

•

Liaison with designated officer in each jurisdiction

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
•

Crisis management plan

•

Designated crisis management team

•

Designated emergency response team

•

Crisis management manual indicating roles and responsibilities

•

Public spokespersons designated and trained

•

Regular exercises

•

Lessons learned

EXERCISES
•

Tabletop crisis management exercises

•

Joint field exercises to test emergency response

•

Covert testing of security

BOMB THREATS
•

Staff trained

•

Bomb threat checklists in place
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A-5

A-6

Best Practices Checklist

•

Ability to record calls

•

Established protocol for threat assessment

•

Search procedures

•

Laminated cards

LEFT ITEMS AND SUSPICIOUS OBJECTS
•

Public awareness

•

Staff trained

•

Established procedure

•

Each item examined and recorded

•

X-ray capability

CARING FOR VICTIMS AND FAMILIES
•

Familiar with NTSB procedures

•

Designated member of crisis team to cover assistance to victims and
information for relatives

•

Protocol to establish contact center at the scene of the incident

OTHER POST-INCIDENT ISSUES
•

Public information plan to restore confidence

•

Counseling for staff involved in disaster

•

Review of lessons learned
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Figures 1 and 2

APPENDIX B: FIGURES 1 AND 2
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B-1

B-2

Figures 1 and 2
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